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CPLR 5240: Court gives judgment debtor credit equal to the difference between the fair market value and the sale price of real property
purchased by the judgment creditorat an execution sale.
Manipulation of lawful enforcement procedures has been the
subject of strong criticism from within the judicial system as well as
from without. 144 Wandschneider v. Bekeny 145 presents a classic example
of such abuse. A judgment in the amount of $97,811.30 had been obtained in the Southern District of New York for securities violations.
After docketing the judgment in Westchester County, the judgment
creditors levied on the debtors' home in New Rochelle which, by the
creditors' own appraisal, had a market value exceeding $55,000. The
home was sold for a trifling $500 at an execution sale at which the
plaintiff's counsel was the only bidder. After losing their home together
with a $27,000 equity therein, the debtors were left with unpaid mortgage notes and the vast bulk of the judgment yet to be satisfied.
The judgment debtors brought an unsuccessful special proceeding
to set aside the sale on the ground that the selling procedure had been
defective. On motion for reargument,146 they contended that the inadequacy of the bid price provided a basis for relief under CPLR
5240,147 in the form of either rescission of the sale or an offset against
the judgment in the amount of the fair market value of the property.
The motion was granted, the court choosing the latter alternative. In
granting this novel form of relief, the court carefully limited itself to
the specific facts of the case before it.
[T]he court holds that where, as here, the purchaser of the property
at the Sheriff's Sale is the holder of the judgment being executed
upon, the judgment debtors are entitled to a credit against the
judgment for the difference between the sale price and the fair
market value of the premises .... 148
144 See Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 561, 578

(1972); M. T. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WrrH LAwYERs 84-98 (1969); 7B McKxNNY's CPLR

5236, supp. commentary at 154 (1969).
145 169 N.Y.L.J. 121, June 22, 1973, at 17, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County).
146 The court labeled this application a motion for rehearing on additional facts.
147 CPLR 5240 reads in pertinent part:
The court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested
person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an order denying, limiting,
conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforcement
procedure ....
This section is analogous to CPLR 3103, which provides for protective orders for abuse
of disclosure procedures. See 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 5240, commentary at 203 (1963).
148 169 N.Y.L.J. 121, at 18, col. 1. The court cited as authority Clarke v. Schumann,
269 N.Y. 60, 198 N.E. 666 (1935), which held that pursuant to CPA 1083(a) the court must
ascertain the market value of property received by a mortgagee as purchaser and must
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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

CPLR 5240 is intended to relieve the judgment debtor from the
harsh consequences which may result from the lawful use of enforcement procedures. Despite its potential, 149 it has been invoked infrequently and generally in cases involving an execution on the husband's
half of a tenancy by the entirety.150 The Wandschneider court noted
that the application of CPLR 5240 to a lawfully consummated sheriff's
sale was unprecedented, but relied on the broad discretion given the
court by that section to avoid unconscionable results. Additionally, the
court considered such relief to be within its equitable jurisdiction.
Although the Wandschneider remedy is new, relief in the post-sale
stage is not wholly unprecedented. In Lee v. Community Capital
Corp.,1'5 the petitioner sought to have an execution sale vacated pursuant to the authority granted in CPLR 5240. In setting it aside, the
court chose instead to rely on Judiciary Law section 489.152 A sheriff's
sale was similarly set aside in Holness v. McGillan,5 3 the court relying
on its general equity powers.
Despite its claim of a narrow holding, the Wandschneider decision may have an impact on the handling of unconscionable but techenter a deficiency judgment for the difference between such value and mortgagor's indebtedness. Today RPAPL 1371(2) would mandate the same result in cases of mortgage
foreclosure.
149 Professor David D. Siegel has noted that:
The problem has not been that CPLR 5240 does not supply such a power [to set
aside a sale]. It just seems to be a matter either of the lawyers not pressing for
that section's application or the judges not taking it as the broad source of
authority it was intended to be.
7B McKINnmY's CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 156 (1969).
150 Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec. Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 363, 341 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1973) (mem.); Hammond v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc., 71 Misc.
2d 546, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Ev. 580, 603 (1973); Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66
Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 355, 378 (1971). In each case the court issued an order
vacating and setting aside the proceedings to conduct the execution sale.
Other decisions relying upon CPLR 5240 are equally unimpressive. See Cook v. H.R.H.
Construction Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 806, 302 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), discussed in The QuarterlySurvey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 532, 574 (1970) (unsuccessful attempt
by one judgment creditor to set aside an execution by another judgment creditor); Olsen
v. Robaey, 45 Misc. 2d 33, 256 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1965) (time requirements relaxed for service, posting and advertising of a notice of postponement of an
execution sale where both parties consented); Kaplan v. Supak 9: Sons Mfg. Co., 46 Misc.
2d 574, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965) (unsuccessful attempt by
judgment creditors to invoke the statute to circumvent the notice requirement for an
income execution).
15167 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 561, 578 (1972).
262 This statute prohibits the assignment of claims to professional collectors for the
purpose of bringing actions thereon.
153 161 N.Y.L.J. 6, Jan. 9, 1969, at 19, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County).
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nically legal execution sales. It serves notice that the courts will not sit
by and permit a judgment creditor to obtain an undeserved windfall
at the debtor's expense. The Wandschneiderremedy will be of greatest
assistance to the low income consumer who is the worst victim of
abuses of the collection process and is the least likely to take advantage
of his legal rights.

54

This decision may give him a later stage at which

to intervene. The Wandschneider procedure has the additional advantage of giving the judgment creditor an equitable means of enforcing
his judgment while protecting the debtor from inequities.
ARnCLjE

75 - ARBITRATION

CPLR 7503(c): Legislature lengthens the period within which a party
may apply for a stay of arbitration.
Pursuant to the Judicial Conference's recommendation, 155 the
Legislature has made several changes in CPLR 7503(c) which will ameliorate some of its harshness. 6 Most importantly, it has extended from
ten to twenty days the time within which a party is allowed to move to
stay arbitration after receipt of a demand for arbitration or a notice
of intention to arbitrate. This time frame remains short enough to
permit expeditious settlement of commercial disputes while allowing
a more reasonable time to respond. 57 Two other changes codify case
law constructions of the subdivision. 5 8 The first authorizes service of a
notice of application to stay arbitration on the adverse party's attorney
provided that the attorney's name appeared on the notice of intention
to arbitrate or the demand for arbitration. The second expressly provides that service of the notice is timely if mailed within the twentyday period. On its own initiative, the Legislature added a clause making null and void any provision in an arbitration agreement purporting to waive the right to apply for a stay. Lastly, the subdivision was
changed to specifically encompass a "demand for arbitration" as well
as a "notice of intention to arbitrate."
154 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 153 (1965).
155 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE 1973 LEcISATURE
IN RELATION TO THE CiviL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES AND PROPOSED AIENDMENTS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 229 OF THE JUDICIARY LAW 59-63 (1973) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENE REPORT].

156 L. 1973, ch. 1028, at 1883, eft. Sept. 1, 1973.
157 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 61.
158 Id. at 62, citing Matter of Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758,

320 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. Jom's L. REv. 500, 531
(1971).

